

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT:PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT INTERVIEW WITH SCHLESINGER IN US NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT, MAY 26, TITLED "NOW - A TOUGHER U.S."

2. Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHY DID WE TAKE SUCH TOUGH ACTION IN
DEALING WITH THE SEIZURE OF THE AMERICAN FREIGHTER MAYAGUEZ
BY THE CAMBODIANS?

A. AMERICAN ACTION MUST BE FIRM WHEN NECESSARY AND WHEN
IMPORTANT ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE ARE INVOLVED. IN THIS CASE
WE WERE FACED WITH A CRUDE AND ILLEGAL ACT OF FORCE.

AMERICAN ACTION WAS NECESSARY NOT ONLY TO PROTECT FREE-
DOM OF THE SEAS AND OF INNOCENT PASSAGE -- LONG-TERM AMERI-
CAN OBJECTIVES; MORE IMPORTANTLY, FOR THE UNITED STATES TO
COUNTENANCE SUCH AN ACT OR TO HAVE YIELDED TO AN ILLEGAL
EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE WOULD HAVE ENCOURAGED ADDITIONAL ACTS
OF HIJACKING OR TERRORISM IN THE FUTURE.

3. Q. ASIDE FROM THE SHIP INCIDENT, IS THERE A DANGER THAT
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THE US IS LOSING PRESTIGE AND POWER IN THE WORLD AS A RESULT
OF OUR FORCED RETREAT FROM INDO-CHINA?

A. IN TERMS OF MILITARY BALANCE IN THE WORLD, INDO-
CHINA HAS HAD A RELATIVELY LIMITED EFFECT.

HOWEVER, I DO BELIEVE THAT THE STATURE OF THE US HAS BEEN DIMINISHED, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, BY WHAT'S HAPPENED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IN TERMS OF THE WAY THE UNITED STATES IS VIEWED AROUND THE WORLD, IT HAS AFFECTED WHAT IS SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES. AN HISTORICAL EPISODE OF THE VIETNAM SORT, INVOLVING A GREAT POWER LIKE THE UNITED STATES, INEVITABLY RAISES QUESTIONS IN THE MINDS OF SOME THAT HAVE A DETRIMENTAL INFLUENCE ON OUR WORLD STANDING.

4. Q. HOW LONG WILL THESE DOUBTS ABOUT US POWER LAST?

A. IT DEPENDS ON THE ACTIONS WE TAKE FROM THIS POINT OUT. IT DEPENDS ON HOW WELL WE LIVE UP TO OTHER COMMITMENTS, WHAT WE DO ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES OVERSEAS, WHAT WE DO ABOUT THE DEFENSE BUDGET -- THE GENERAL COHESION THAT THE UNITED STATES EXHIBITS. THESE OTHER FACTORS WILL PERHAPS BE MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN THE VIETNAM EPISODE ITSELF.

5. Q. ARE AMERICANS LOSING THEIR WILL TO BE WORLD LEADERS?

A. THE REAL PROBLEM WE FACE IS WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE MORAL STAMINA OF THE WEST, AND IN PARTICULAR TO WESTERN LEADERSHIP GROUPS. THAT IS NOT A PROBLEM CONFINED TO THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS SOME TENDENCY AMONG OUR FASHIONABLE CLASSES, FIRST, TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER POWER IN ITSELF IS NOT IMMORAL AND, SECONDLY, WHETHER IT IS APPROPRIATE TO FIGHT FOR THE VALUES OF THE WEST -- WHETHER THOSE VALUES ARE EVEN DEFENSIBLE.

SO I THINK THAT OUR BASIC PROBLEM AS A NATION IS NOT OUR PHYSICAL STRENGTH OR OUR STANCE. IT IS A QUESTION OF REVIVING THE UNDERLYING MORAL STAMINA AND THE INTERNAL FIBER OF THIS NATION, AS WELL AS OF OTHER FREE-WORLD NATIONS.

6. Q. HOW CAN THE US GO ABOUT INCREASING ITS CREDIBILITY?

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A. I THINK THAT WE SHOULD ACT WITH SOBRIETY AND SERIOUSNESS IN THE WAKE OF VIETNAM. WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO ACT WITH SELF-CONFIDENCE, THAT IT WILL NOT GIVE WAY TO AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF INTERNAL AND DESTRUCTIVE DEBATE. OUR ENERGIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE EXERTED IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD IN A PRODUCTIVE WAY FROM OUR OWN STANDPOINT AND THE STANDPOINT OF OUR ALLIES.

7. Q. PRESIDENT FORD SAYS THE UNITED STATES SHOULD STAND BY ITS COMMITMENTS, BUT CONGRESS SAYS, "NO MORE VIETNAMS." WHO WILL PREVAIL?

- A. THE MAIN POINT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES FARES FAR BETTER UNDER SITUATIONS IN WHICH THERE IS AN UNAMBIGUOUS ASSAULT -- AN UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION, AN ATTACK ACROSS A LINE OF DEMARCACTION -- THAN IT DOES UNDER CONDITIONS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH EXISTED IN VIETNAM.

IF THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES ARE OPENLY AND CLEARLY ATTACKED, I THINK THAT THE RESPONSE OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL BE TO FULFILL THE OBLIGATIONS INTO WHICH WE HAVE ENTERED. BY CONTRAST, I THINK THE EXPRESSION "NO MORE VIETNAMS" REFERS TO GETTING INVOLVED IN WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO BE UNCLEAR AND AMBIGUOUS INTERNAL TURMOIL -- SUPPOSEDLY A CIVIL WAR -- WHICH THE VIETNAM CONFLICT SEEMED TO BE FOR SO MANY YEARS.

8. Q. ARE THE RUSSIANS LIKELY TO TRY EXPLOITING THE SITUATION TODAY IN THE WAKE OF THE COLLAPSE IN INDO-CHINA?

A. I THINK THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE CONCERNED THAT ONE OF THE REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL BE A WEAKENING OF FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTING DETENTE. FOR THAT REASON, THEY WILL HAVE GOOD REASONS NOT TO ROCK THE BOAT TOO SOON. THEY MAY FEEL TEMPTED, BUT THEY MAY DECIDE THIS IS NOT THE TIME TO GIVE AWAY TO THAT TEMPTATION.

ONE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS LOOK PRIMARILY AT THE REALITIES OF POWER -- WHAT THEY REFER TO AS THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES." THEY REGARD DETENTE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A SHIFT OF FORCES TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THEIR VIEW IS THAT THE WEST IS MAKING ACCOMMODATION TO THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER. IN THE LONGER RUN, UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY BALANCE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION, THEY WILL BE INCLINED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT SHIFT.

9. Q. RETURNING TO ASIA: WHAT CHANGES DO YOU SEE NOW IN OUR DEFENSE POSTURE IN THAT REGION?

A. IT DEPENDS IN PART ON HOW THE NEW GOVERNMENTS IN CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM COMPORT THEMSELVES. IT DEPENDS ALSO ON THE LONGER-TERM REACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, WHICH ARE TOO EARLY TO ASSESS.

GENERALLY SPEAKING, I THINK THE UNITED STATES WILL BE LESS EAGER TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN CONFUSING DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND MILITARY TURMOIL ON THE ASIAN CONTINENT. BUT IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THE US COMMITMENTS TO NORTHEAST ASIA, TO KOREA AS WELL AS TO JAPAN, WILL BE PERCEIVED AS SOMETHING NO ONE SHOULD CHALLENGE.

10. Q. DOES THAT INCLUDE TAIWAN?

A. AS LONG AS WE ARE BOUND BY THE TREATY, OF COURSE,
IT WOULD INCLUDE TAIWAN.

11. Q. IS THERE A DANGER THAT NORTH KOREA WILL BE TEMPTED
TO START TROUBLE IN HOPES THAT CONGRESS WOULD FORCE WITH-
DRAWAL OF US TROOPS RATHER THAN INVOLVE THEM IN A WAR?

A. I THINK THAT PRECIPITATING A CRISIS WITH THE UNITED
STATES IN THIS PARTICULAR PERIOD WOULD BE A VERY RASH
ACTION TO TAKE, ESPECIALLY WHERE THERE ARE US FORCES
PRESENT. WE HAVE UPWARDS OF 40,000 MEN IN SOUTH KOREA.

SOUTH KOREA GUARDS THE APPROACHES TO JAPAN. IT LIES
IN A CONFLUENCE OF FOUR GREAT POWERS -- THE US, THE USSR,
CHINA AND JAPAN. ALSO, IT REPRESENTS A HISTORIC INVOLVE-
MENT AND COMMITMENT BY THE UNITED STATES.

ANY SUDDEN WEAKENING OF THAT COMMITMENT -- PARTICULAR-
LY AFTER VIETNAM -- WOULD BE OF SUCH MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE
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THAT IT COULD UNRAVEL THE SITUATION IN ASIA AND POSSIBLY
ELSEWHERE.

12. Q. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE US WOULD RESORT TO DRASTIC
ACTION IF SOUTH KOREA WERE INVADED?
A. I WOULDN'T REFER TO "DRASTIC ACTION." BUT ONE OF
THE LESSONS OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT IS THAT RATHER
THAN SIMPLY COUNTER YOUR OPPONENT'S THRUSTS, IT IS NECES-
SARY TO GO FOR THE HEART OF THE OPPONENT'S POWER: DESTROY
HIS MILITARY FORCES RATHER THAN SIMPLY BEING INVOLVED END-
LESSLY IN ANCILLARY MILITARY OPERATIONS.

13. Q. THEN NORTH KOREA WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME THAT THE US
WOULD STRIKE BACK HARD IF SOUTH KOREA WERE INVADED --

A. I THINK THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE UNITED
STATES WOULD TAKE MORE-VIGOROUS ACTION THAN WE WERE INCLIN-
ED TO TAKE DURING MUCH OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR.

THE MAIN POINT IS THAT A CONFLICT THAT EXTENDS FOR 10
YEARS -- OR EVEN OVER MANY YEARS, AS VIETNAM DID -- IS
BOUND TO LOSE THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. THERE-
FORE, ACTION MUST BE MORE VIGOROUS AT THE OUTSET, particu-
LARLY WHERE THERE ARE AMERICAN FORCES INVOLVED.

14. Q. SO THE US WOULDN'T FEEL THE SAME CONSTRAINTS TO
AVOID HEAVY BOMBING, BLOCKADES AND THAT SORT OF THING IN
KOREA THAT WE FELT IN VIETNAM --

A. I WOULD DOUBT IT.

15. Q. WHAT ABOUT FEAR OF CHINA'S INTERVENING?

A. I THINK THE CHINESE WOULD ATTEMPT TO AVOID ANY SUCH CONFLICT, OR TO TAMP IT DOWN IF IT SHOULD GET STARTED IN A SMALL WAY, RATHER THAN TO ENCOURAGE OR REINFORCE IT.

16. Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHO DO YOU THINK GAINS FROM THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN INDO-CHINA?

A. HANOI GAINS, THE SOVIET UNION PROBABLY GAINS -- AND CHINA LOSES TO THE EXTENT THAT THE OTHER TWO GAIN.

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17. Q. WHY DO YOU SAY CHINA LOSES AND RUSSIA GAINS?

A. THERE CONTINUES TO BE SUBSTANTIAL TENSION BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE. THE CHINESE NOW HAVE A STRONG MILITARY STATE TO THEIR SOUTHEAST, MORE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAN WITH CHINA. TO THAT EXTENT, CHINA'S POSITION IS WEAKENED.

18. Q. DOES THIS MEAN CHINA WILL BECOME EVEN MORE INTERESTED IN CEMENTING RELATIONS WITH THE US?

A. I THINK THAT CHINA'S INTEREST IN MAINTAINING REASONABLY WARM RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES. THEY WILL BE CONCERNED TO MAINTAIN SUCH CONNECTIONS IF THEY HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT SUDDENLY GOING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WESTERN PACIFIC.

19. Q. DO YOU MEAN THAT THE CHINESE, WHO FOR YEARS HAVE TRIED TO DRIVE THE US OUT OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC, NOW ARE BENT ON KEEPING US THERE?

A. I THINK THAT IS CORRECT. THE CHINESE NO LONGER REGARD THE AMERICANS AS THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO THEIR SURVIVAL BUT AS A USEFUL BALANCE AGAINST THE SOVIETS.

20. Q. WILL THE VIETNAMESE ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO ESTABLISH NAVAL BASES IN THEIR COUNTRY?

A. GIVEN THE ATTITUDE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, I THINK THIS IS NOT THE MOMENT IN HISTORY WHEN THEY ARE LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN BASES ON VIETNAMESE SOIL.

21. Q. DOES THE UNITED STATES WANT JAPAN TO SPEND MORE MONEY ON DEFENSE INSTEAD OF RELYING SO MUCH ON AMERICAN FORCES?

A. WE WOULD EXPECT THE JAPANESE TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THEIR ROLE IN THE COMMON DEFENSE. THAT INCLUDES PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, PROTECTION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AIR DEFENSE AND THE LIKE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN LESS VIGOROUS IN RECENT YEARS

THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED, WE WOULD EXPECT A RENEWED EMPHASIS.

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22. Q. SWITCHING TO ANOTHER PART OF THE WORLD: WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE INDO-CHINA DEBACLE IN WESTERN EUROPE?

A. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS ARE MUCH LESS CONCERNED ABOUT VIETNAM THAN THE EFFECT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REPERCUSSIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES -- THE SELF-CONFIDENCE AND ABILITY OF THIS COUNTRY TO CARRY ON AS LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD.

23. Q. WILL THERE BE LESS PRESSURE NOW IN CONGRESS TO PULL AMERICAN TROOPS OUT OF EUROPE?

A. I HOPE IT WILL NOT BE A MAJOR ISSUE THIS YEAR. SOMEBODY, OF COURSE, WILL RAISE IT. BUT I THINK THE GENERAL REACTION WILL BE THAT THIS IS NOT THE TIME TO SEEM TO BE GOING BACK ON AMERICAN COMMITMENTS. PEOPLE WHO IN THE PAST HAVE QUESTIONED THE SIZE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE WILL NOT BE INCLINED TO RAISE THE QUESTION THIS YEAR FOR FEAR THAT IT WILL BE MISREAD.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS FORCES IN EUROPE AND EVEN BE PREPARED TO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO INCREASE CAPABILITY ON THE PART OF THE NATO ALLIANCE, PROVIDED THAT THE EUROPEAN NATIONS DO THEIR PART.

EUROPE'S "FREE RIDE" ON DEFENSE

24. Q. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, HAVE US ALLIES LEARNED ANY LESSONS FROM VIETNAM?

A. IF OUR ALLIES HAVE LEARNED A LESSON, IT'S THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT DO IT BY ITSELF -- THAT OUR ALLIES MUST BE AT LEAST EQUALLY SERIOUS ABOUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO THEMSELVES. THAT WILL BE A VERY VALUABLE LESSON LEARNED.

WHEN WE TALK ABOUT CREDIBILITY, ONE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT THE ONLY QUESTION. IN THE CASE OF WESTERN EUROPE, A NUMBER OF THE NATIONS OVER THERE HAVE ENJOYED AMERICAN PROTECTION AND HAVE FELT THEY HAVE HAD VIRTUALLY A FREE RIDE WITH REGARD TO THEIR OWN DEFENSES. IT'S LESS OF AN ISSUE OF WHETHER THE UNITED STATES IS INCLINED TO ABANDON EUROPE THAN WHETHER THE EUROPEANS ARE INCLINED TO ABANDON THEMSELVES?

25. Q. WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE THEM TO DO?

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A. THE PROPSENSITY HAS EXISTED IN WESTERN EUROPE TO BASE THEIR DEFENSE BUDGETS ON HOPE, ON ILLUSION, ON THE PROSPECTS OF ARMS REDUCTIONS BY THE EAST. MANY OF THEM HAVE WANTED TO CUT THEIR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES TO RESPOND

TO VARIOUS NAIVE IMPULSES WITHIN THEIR ELECTORATES. THAT TREND WILL HAVE TO BE CURBED. THE ASSUMPTION THAT US PROTECTION IN AND OF ITSELF RELIEVES SOME EUROPEAN STATES OF BUILDING FORCES IN THEIR OWN BEHALF IS SOMETHING THAT DISAPPEARED WITH THE GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY IN RECENT YEARS. AT THIS STAGE OF THE GAME THE EUROPEAN NATIONS MUST TAKE DEFENSE VERY SERIOUSLY. THEY CANNOT BE DRIVEN PRIMARILY BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL OR BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS.

26. Q. WHAT LEVERAGE DOES THE US HAVE -- ASIDE FROM THE THREAT TO REDUCE FORCES -- TO PERSUADE EUROPEANS TO SPEND MORE ON THEIR OWN DEFENSE?

A. THE PROBLEM ONE FACES IS THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE MORE LIKELY TO MOVE TOWARD AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE EVENT OF AN AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL -- PARTICULARLY AN AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL THAT HAS THE SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE THAT IT MIGHT HAVE IN THE WAKE OF VIETNAM. OUR POINT SHOULD BE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO KEEP OUR FORCES THERE, DEPENDING ON EUROPEAN ACTIONS AND A EUROPEAN SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY.

27. Q. WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF PERSUADING NATO COUNTRIES TO INCREASE THEIR ARMED FORCES?

A. THE REAL QUESTION IS: ARE THEY PREPARED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL SACRIFICES TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE?

THAT IS A QUESTION THAT CAN BE ANSWERED DIFFERENTLY FOR THE SEVERAL NATIONS. SOME OF THEM HAVE MADE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS AND HAVE EXPANDED THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH MARKEDLY IN RECENT YEARS. OTHERS HAVE COME TO BELIEVE THAT IT'S ALL OVER IN THE WAKE OF DETENTE, AND THAT THEY'RE MORE OR LESS FREE TO LOSE INTEREST IN MAINTAINING MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

WE THINK THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SPEND
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MORE THAN 3 PER CENT OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SECURITY AND RETAIN INDEPENDENCE. IF THEY'RE NOT WILLING TO SPEND MORE THAN 3 PER CENT OF THEIR GNP, THERE IS SOME QUESTION ABOUT HOW SERIOUS THEY ARE.

WEAKENING OF NATO'S FLANKS

28. Q. MR. SCHLESINGER, HOW CAN NATO FUNCTION NOW THAT ONE MEMBER -- PORTUGAL -- HAS COMMUNISTS IN ITS GOVERNMENT?

A. UNDOUBTEDLY SOME OF THE DEVELOPMENTS ON BOTH THE EASTERN AND WESTERN ENDS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN HAVE DIMINISHED THE COHESION OF NATO. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT PROVIDE ITS MOST INTIMATE PLANS AND SECRETS WHEN THERE ARE

COMMUNISTS PRESENT IN ANY PLANNING MEETING.

29. Q. TURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST: HAVE THE DANGERS OF WAR IN THIS AREA RECEDED?

A. NOT NOTABLY. THERE HAVE BEEN PERIODS OF GREATER IMMEDIATE TENSION THAN THE PRESENT ONE, BUT I WOULD NOT SAY THAT GENERALLY THE PROSPECTS OF WAR HAVE RECEDED. I DO THINK THAT ALL PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST RECOGNIZE THE ADVANTAGES OF AVOIDING A NEW CONFLAGRATION.

30. Q. DO THE ISRAELIS HAVE THE EQUIPMENT THEY NEED TO WITHSTAND ANOTHER ARAB ATTACK?

A. AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, THE MILITARY BALANCE IS FAR MORE FAVORABLE FROM ISRAEL'S STANDPOINT THAN IT WAS IN OCTOBER, 1973.

31. Q. WOULD THE US BE ABLE TO RESUPPLY THE ISRAELIS FAST ENOUGH IN EVENT OF WAR, DESPITE THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF PLANE-REFUELING STATIONS SUCH AS THE AZORES?

A. YES. ASSUMING THERE IS A POLICY DECISION TO DO IT AND CONGRESS VOTES THE FUNDS, WE ARE CAPABLE OF STARTING TO DELIVER SUPPLIES INTO ISRAEL ABOUT 36 HOURS AFTER AN ORDER IS GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT.

32. Q. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL CAUTION AFTER VIETNAM, WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS OF CONTINUED HELP FOR ISRAEL?

A. THE HISTORICAL ATTITUDES OF CONGRESS TOWARD REQUESTS FOR VIETNAM AND ISRAEL ARE AS DIFFERENT AS NIGHT AND DAY.

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CONGRESS HAS SHOWN SIGNS OF APPROVING ANY REQUESTS MADE BY

THE ADMINISTRATION -- AND, IN FACT, SOME PROPENSITY TO AUGMENT REQUESTS OF SOME ADMINISTRATIONS -- FOR AID TO ISREAL.

33. Q. IF ANOTHER MIDEAST WAR BREAKS OUT, IS THERE ANYTHING THE US COULD DO ABOUT ANOTHER ARAB OIL EMBARGO?

A. THE UNITED STATES COULD, OF COURSE, TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO A HYPOTHETICAL EMBARGO. AND I THINK THAT WE ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE TOLERANT OF A RENEWED EMBARGO THAN WE WERE OF THE INITIAL ONE IN 1973.

34. Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY "LESS TOLERANT"?

A. THAT IMPLIES THAT WE MIGHT NOT REMAIN ENTIRELY PASSIVE TO THE IMPOSITION OF SUCH AN EMBARGO. I'M NOT GOING TO INDICATE ANY PROSPECTIVE REACTION OTHER THAN TO POINT OUT THERE ARE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL OR CONCEIVABLY MILITARY MEASURES IN RESPONSE.

35. Q. WITH REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, DO YOU EXPECT A MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL BUILD-UP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN?

A. I WOULD EXPECT THAT THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE

INDIAN OCEAN WILL EXPAND. REOPENING OF THE CANAL REDUCES THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION BY SOMETHING LIKE 6,500 MILES, AND THAT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE SOME EFFECT.

THE SOVIETS ARE BUILDING A MAJOR FACILITY AT BERBERA ON THE GULF OF ADEN -- SO EXPENSIVE A FACILITY THAT IT'S OBVIOUSLY NOT INTENDED PURELY FOR SHOW PURPOSES OR DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR THE SOMALIS.

36. Q. WHAT SORT OF INSTALLATION IS IT?

A. IT CONSISTS OF PORT FACILITIES, AN EXPANDED AIR-STRIP. THEY ARE CONSTRUCTING BARRACKS. THEY ARE BUILDING A REWORK FACILITY FOR EITHER AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. THAT KIND OF EXPANSION SUGGESTS THAT THEY ARE MORE THAN MILDLY INTERESTED IN

THEIR MILITARY POWER ASTRIDE THE LIFELINE OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD TO THE PERSIAN GULF. I DON'T THINK THERE'S UNCLASSIFIED

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ANY OTHER READING.

37. Q. HOW WILL THE UNITED STATES RESPOND?

A. WE WILL HAVE TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY BALANCE AND BE PREPARED TO OFFSET ANY EXPANSION OF SOVIET MILITARY OR NAVAL CAPACITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.

WE STILL HAVE OUR REQUEST FOR EXPANSION OF OUR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT DIEGO GARCIA. WE WOULD PLAN TO ENLARGE THAT FACILITY, INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE AIRSTRIP, PROVIDE BERTHING FACILITIES TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY.

MIDEAST: "US HAS TO HOLD THE RING"

38Q. THEN THE US IS STILL DETERMINED TO KEEP A STRONG FORCE IN THE MIDEAST --

A. I THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS GOT TO HOLD THE RING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE'S JUST NOBODY ELSE WHO CAN STAND UP TO THE SOVIET UNION. SOME AMERICANS WANT TO GO OFF IN A SULK FOR FIVE YEARS. BUT IF WE DO, WE'LL WAKE UP SOME BRIGHT DAY AND DISCOVER THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARAMOUNT POWER IN THE EASTERN HEMISPHERE. WE JUST ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO INDULGE IN THAT LUXURY.

39. Q. HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES STAND IN RELATION TO THE SOVIET UNION IN TERMS OF MILITARY STRENGTH?

A. THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIET UNION IS A PRODUCT OF LONG-TERM TRENDS. QUITE OBVIOUSLY, IF SOVIET STRENGTH GOES ON GROWING BY 3 TO 5 PER CENT A YEAR IN REAL TERMS AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO SHRINK IN MILITARY POWER, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SAY FOR

MUCH LONGER THAT THE UNITED STATES IS SECOND TO NONE.

40. Q. HOW MUCH IS RUSSIA SPENDING ON ITS ARMED FORCES?

A. AT THIS POINT, THEY ARE OUTSPENDING US BY AT LEAST 20 TO 25 PER CENT. ONE CAN LIVE WITH A GAP BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIETS AS LONG AS IT REMAINS MODEST AND AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES MAKE SERIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO MUTUAL SECURITY. WE DO NOT HAVE TO COMPETE WITH THEM IN ANY PARTICULAR FISCAL YEAR.

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BUT WHAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT -- WHAT WE CANNOT LIVE WITH -- IS THE TREND OF RECENT YEARS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INCREASE STRENGTH WHILE THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO SHRINK. WE CANNOT LIVE WITH THAT OVER MANY YEARS AND MAINTAIN A MILITARY BALANCE WHICH WILL PRECLUDE SOVIET PREPONDERANCE IN THE EASTERN HEMISPHERE.

41. Q. WASN'T DETENTE SUPPOSED TO BE A "LIVE AND LET LIVE" ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD AVOID MORE MILITARY BUILD-UPS?

A. THE SOVIETS DO NOT USE THE TERM "DETENTE." THEY USE THE TERM "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE," WHICH IS A PHRASE COINED BY LENIN AND EMPLOYED BY STALIN. THE SOVIETS SEE DETENTE AS A WAY TO AVOID THE RISK OF WAR AND EXPAND THEIR POWER RELATIVE TO THEIR FORMER OPPONENTS. AS LONG AS THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN HAVE THINGS BOTH WAYS, THERE WILL BE NO INTERNAL STRUGGLE OVER DETENTE IN THE SOVIET UNION.
IN THE LONG RUN, THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT AN INTERPRETATION OF DETENTE THAT IMPLIES AN EVER-STRENGTHENING OF THE CORRELATION OF FORCES IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION. I THINK THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO COME CLOSER TO THE VIEW OF DETENTE AS "LIVE AND LET LIVE."

A RETURN TO ISOLATIONISM?"NO"

42. Q. IS THE ISOLATIONIST TREND IN THIS COUNTRY GROWING?

A. NO, I COME TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. I DON'T THINK THAT THE NEO-ISOLATIONIST TENDENCIES ARE INDEED THAT STRONG. I THINK THAT EVERYBODY RECOGNIZES THAT THE UNITED STATES IS IN NO POSITION NOW TO RETURN TO THE KIND OF INTERNATIONAL POLICIES WE FOLLOWED IN THE 1930S--THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD DEPENDS UPON THE VERY GREAT COUNTER-WEIGHT TO SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH THAT IS REPRESENTED BY AMERICAN POWER.

43. Q. WHAT ABOUT TALK IN CONGRESS ABOUT THE US PULLING BACK ON SOME OF ITS OVERSEAS OBLIGATIONS?

A. I THINK THAT IF ONE EXAMINES THE REACTIONS ON THE HILL, THAT THEY ARE NOT IN THE DIRECTION OF ISOLATION-

ISM BY AND LARGE. IT IS A SCRUTINY OF WHAT ARE REGARDED
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AS UNWISE COMMITMENTS.

MOST OF THE REACTIONS ARE STRONGLY IN SUPPORT OF
NATO, OUR COMMITMENTS TO WESTERN EUROPE. THERE IS A
RECOGNITION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS A MAJOR ROLE TO
PLAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I HAVE HEARD OF NO SUGGESTIONS
THAT THE UNITED STATES CEASE ITS SUPPORT OF JAPAN OR
WITHDRAW FROM ITS INVOLVEMENT WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW
ZEALAND.

UNDOUBTEDLY THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TONE OF
TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS AND THE GENERAL POST-WORLD WAR II
REACTION IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES FELT ITSELF ENGAGED IN
THE WORLD UP TO THE HILT. WE ARE GOING TO BE MORE
SELECTIVE, BUT THAT IS NOT NEO-ISOLATIONISM.

44. Q. THEN YOU DON'T FEEL THAT THE AVERAGE AMERICAN
WANTS HIS COUNTRY TO PULL INTO A SHELL--

A. NOT AT ALL. IF ONE EXAMINES REACTIONS OF THE
GENERAL PUBLIC, IT IS PLAIN THAT MOST PEOPLE--IN CONTRAST
TO SOME SOCALLED LEADERSHIP GROUPS--FEEL THE UNITED STATES
MUST REMAIN A VERY STRONG MILITARY POWER, SECOND TO NONE.
THEY SUPPORT A DEFENSE BUDGET OF THE PRESENT SIZE OR
LARGER.

45. Q. WHAT "LEADERSHIP GROUPS" ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT?

A. I MEAN INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN POLLED IN
BUSINESS, EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATIONS.

46. Q. THE ESTABLISHMENT--

A. IT'S A PECULIAR KIND OF ESTABLISHMENT. IT'S AN
ANTIESTABLISHMENT ESTABLISHMENT.
THESE GROUPS HAVE CERTAIN ASPIRATIONS WITH REGARD TO
WHAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ACCOMPLISH IN THE WORLD.
BUT THEY RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER IT'S APPROPRIATE
TO HAVE THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES.
THEY SUFFER FROM THE ILLUSION THAT, HAVING DISCOVERED
SOME OF THE INADEQUACIES OF A POSITION OF STRENGTH, THAT
THIS WILL BE COMPENSATED FOR BY A POSITION OF WEAKNESS.
THEY'RE JUST TOTALLY WRONG, AND IT IS NOT AN ILLUSION
SHARED BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

47. Q. WILL VOTERS SUPPORT INCREASED MILITARY SPENDING?

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A. I THINK THEY WILL. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT AT
THIS POINT WE HAVE A SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF MEN UNDER ARMS
THAN WE HAD IN THE RATHER CAREFREE DEMOBILIZATION PERIOD

AFTER WORLD WAR II. THE PROPORTION OF OUR PUBLIC EXPENDITURES GOING FOR DEFENSE IS THE LOWEST SINCE BEFORE PEARL HARBOR.

I DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS ALL THAT DIFFICULT TO CONVEY TO THE US PUBLIC THAT A MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM UNDERLIES DETENTE. AFTER ALL, IT IS IMPLICIT IN THE AMERICAN EMBLEM, IN WHICH THE EAGLE HOLDS IN ONE TALON AN OLIVE BRANCH AND IN THE OTHER TALON A CLUTCH OF ARROWS.

MILITARY STRENGTH AND PEACE GO TOGETHER. THE ABANDONMENT OF ONE WILL ULTIMATELY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE OTHER.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC 10039, MAYAGUEZ SS, PRESS CONFERENCES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NAVAL COMBAT OPERATIONS, MILITARY PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE116621
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PA/M:PDENNIS:SAC
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750176-0227
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197505102/baaaakch.tel
Line Count: 611
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN PA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23 JUL 2003 by SilvaL0>; APPROVED <05 FEB 2004 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, CB, US, (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (SCHLESINGER, JAMES R)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006